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INTRODUCTION
In 1959, Mrs. Ethel West Cotnam of Alabama won a ground
breaking lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service when the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals allowed her to subtract her legal fees, paid to
her lawyer on a contingency basis, from her gross income.1 Mrs.
Cotnam sued the estate of her fo rmer employer when the administra
tor refused to honor the decedent's promise to pay her one-fifth of his
estate if she would care for him the rest of his life.2 Upon the success
ful disposition of this suit,3 the Supreme Court of Alabama awarded
Mrs. Cotnam $120,000.4 Of that amount, $50,365.83 went to her attor1.

Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119. 126 (Sth Cir. 1959).

2. Her employer, T. Shannon Hunter, died intestate. Id. at 1 20.
3. Mrs. Cotnam successfully fended off allegations Mr. Hunter never made the promise,
and that, if he did, part of her duties were sexual in nature. Id. at 1 2 1 n.2.
4. Id. at 121.
1 102
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ney, and the Internal Revenue Service determined she owed
$36,985.02 in taxes.5 The Tax Court upheld this decision.6 Mrs. Cotnam
appealed, claiming she possessed no control over the funds diverted to
her attorney, and that, once she signed the contingent-fee contract,7
she never could lay claim to the money.8 In a two-to-one decision, the
Fifth Circuit agreed, reasoning that, because Mrs. Cotnam never
enjoyed the benefit of this alleged income, it in fact did not constitute
income as to her.9 This decision created a split between the circuits10
that has irked the Internal Revenue Service and a majority on the Tax
Court to this day. 1 1
For nearly forty years, the Fifth Circuit stood alone i n holding that
plaintiffs can subtract attorneys' fees from gross income.12 The major
ity of circuit courts, less sympathetic to those in Mrs. Cotnam's posi
tion, 13 distinguished her case based on the unique attributes of the
attorney charging-lien statute under which her lawyers collected.14 In
their view, a contingent-fee agreement constitutes nothing more than
an anticipatory assignment of income, whereby the taxpayer transfers
his or her right to income to someone else in order to decrease tax
liability. 15 The taxpayer remains firmly in control of the income-

5. Cotnam v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 947 ( 1 957).
6. Id.
7. A contingent fee is defined as "[a] fee charged for a lawyer's services only if the
lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court. Contingent fees are usu[ally] calcu
lated as a percentage of the client's net recovery (such as 25% of the recovery if the case is
settled, and 33% if the case is won at trial). BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (7th ed. 1 999).
'

8. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25.
9. See id.
10. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 1 14 T.C. 399, 408 (2000) (hereinafter Kenseth I] (listing cir
cuit court decisions where the I RS pursued arguments similar to the one used in Cotnam and
prevailed).
11. See id. at 408-12 (expounding at length on the continued wisdom of the tax court's
original position).
12. The Eleventh Circuit, created when the old Fifth Circuit was split into the current
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, remains bound by the pre-split Fifth Circuit precedents such as
Cotnam. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 981 ) (en bane).
13. The First. Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits all rejected similar ap
proaches by taxpayers. See Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2001); Coady v.
Comm'r, 2 1 3 F.3d 1 187 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. I nternal Revenue Service, 72 F.3d 938
(1st Cir. 1 995); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Bagley v. Comm'r. 105
T.C. 396, 4 18-19 (1995) (holding without mentioning Cotnam that settlement portion paid to
attorneys pursuant to contingent fee was income to client), affd 1 21 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1 997);
O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707 (1962), affd 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
14. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. at 408-09 (claiming Judge Wisdom's opinion
rested on the language of the Alabama statute). The Alabama statute in question gives
attorneys the same rights as their clients in regard to collecting judgments. See ALA. CODE
§ 64 ( 1940). In general, such attorney charging-lien laws displace the common-law liens de
scribed in footnote 24, infra.
1 5. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Kenseth II]; Coady,
213 F.3d at 1 191; Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. at 411 n.5; O'Brien, 38 T.C. at 712.

·

1104

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1102

generating vehicle, the lawsuit, and merely directs the proceeds to
another, either in order to satisfy a debt,16 or to divert the funds to
someone in a lower tax bracket.'7 Under such an analysis, taxpayers do
possess dominion over the portion of their awards going toward legal
fees. They have simply chosen to direct these ·proceeds to others in
order to settle debts or lower their tax burden.18 Although taxing suc
cessful litigants in this manner may seem unfair, a number of circuits
have made it clear that, because Congress remains in control of tax
policy, the courts should not make ad hoc adjustments in an attempt to
promote equity.19
Rejecting this analysis, the Sixth Circuit, in 2000, decided to follow

Cotnam v. Commissioner0 in Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v.
United States,21 stating to do otherwise would constitute double
taxation.22 The Estate of Clarks court noted that, in the anticipatory
assignment of income cases cited by other courts, the Internal
Revenue Service either taxed the donor or the donee, but not both.23
Significantly, though 'the panel briefly discussed the Alabama attorney
charging-lien statute, Michigan, where Estate of Clarks originated, has
only a common law attorney lien, not a statute.24 Attributing no great

16. Justice Stone condemned such arrangements, reasoning that, even if the money
never came within the taxpayer's physical control, he nevertheless determined the fate of
this income. See Helvering v. Horst, 3 1 1 U.S. 112, 1 16 ( 1 940).
1 7. See id. at 1 1 4 (diverting funds to a son in a lower tax bracket); Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. ll I, 114- 1 5 ( 1 930) (attempting to split husband's income between husband and wife
before paying taxes).
18. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 1 16 (stating that taxpayers realize a gain when they exchange
the power to receive income for something of economic worth).
1 9. See Kenseth II, supra note 15, 259 F.3d at 885; Chapman v. Comm'r, 618 F.2d 856,
874 (Isl Cir. 1 980); Nassau Lens Co. v. Comm'r, 308 F.2d 39, 45-46 (2nd Cir. 1962):
Darren J. Campbell, Comment, Wiping the Slate Clean: An Examination on How a Court's
Characterization of Contingent Attorney's Fees Implicates the Alternative Minimum Tax and
A ffects the Taxpayers, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 171, 200 (2001) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit

violated the separation of powers doctrine when it misapplied federal tax law to alleviate the
harsh results to the taxpayer); see also Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 653 (1949)
(condemning courts that try to mold tax policy); Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 407
(noting the dangers in j udicial modification of established tax law principles).
20. 263 F.2d 1 1 9 (5th Cir. 1959).
2 1 . 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
22. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
23. See id.
24. hi. at 856. The common law attorney lien:
was a device invented by the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of
their clients, by disabling clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for
the valuable services by which the recoveries were obtained. The lien was never enforced
like other liens. If the fund recovered was in possession or under the control of the court, it
would not allow the client to obtain it until he had paid his attorney. and in administering the
fund it would see that the attorney was protected. If the thing recovered was in a judgment,
and notice of the attorney's claim had been given, the court would not allow the judgment to
be paid to the prejudice of the attorney.
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weight to this issue, the court noted, "Michigan law operates in more
or less the same way as the Alabama lien in Cotnam."25 Thus, the court
refused to require any statutory grant of power to the plaintiff's attor
ney over the j udgment award before finding that the plaintiff lacked
sufficient control over the portion paid to the attorney to avoid tax on
this amount.
Another significant decision in 2000 arose in Srivastava v.
Commissioner26 when the Fifth Circuit considered a Texas case and
refused to limit Cotnam to Alabama.27 The Internal Revenue Service
sought to isolate Alabama residents as the only taxpayers entitled to
take advantage of the Cotnam decision.28 The panel found the differ
ences in the Texas and Alabama attorney charging laws irrelevant in
regard to the taxpayer-plaintiff.29 The sole consideration before the
court in regard to the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine con
sisted of the "degree of control and dominion over the asset."30 Find
ing Cotnam controlling in this case, the panel concluded that a
contingent-fee agreement constitutes a significant shift of control from
the plaintiff to the attorney.31
This Note argues that plaintiffs assign a portion of their cause of
action to their attorneys when they sign contingent-fee agreements.
Part I argues the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is inap
plicable to contingent-fee agreements. Part II contends the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits have already implicitly held that plaintiffs assign a
portion of their claims to their attorneys upon signing contingent
fee agreements, and explains why this approach is correct. Part III
concludes that section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code - property
transferred in connection with performance of services - is ill suited
to contingent-fee arrangements, and supports a barter analysis for
determining the tax liability of each party.

Id. (quoting RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1 16, at 559 (2d

ed. 1955) in tum quoting Goodrich v. McDonald, 19 N.E. 649 (N.Y. 1889) (internal quota
tion marks omitted)).
25. Id.
26. 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
27. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 364-65 (stating the Commissioner's belief that Cotnam should
be distinguished because the Alabama statute gave attorneys more power to enforce their
rights than the Texas statute did).
28. See id. at 363.
29. See id. at 363-64.
30. Id.
3 1 . Id. at 364-65. The court, however. also announced that what the attorney's rights
were had no bearing on the situation. Id.

1106
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(MIS)APPLYING THE ANTICIPATORY ASSIGNMENT O F INCOME
DOCTRINE

This Part examines the anticipatory assignment of income theory
applied by courts in the majority from two perspectives - paying off a
debt by assigning income previously earned, and the actual enjoyment
of the income test - and finds both inapplicable to contingent-fee
situations. Section I.A argues that a contingent-fee agreement does
not pay off a debt in such a way as to trigger the anticipatory assign
ment of income doctrine. Section l.B contends that whether or not the
taxpayer enjoys the income should be irrelevant to a court's holding,
and reveals that the courts actually disagree on whether the taxpayer
realizes the income.
A.

Lack of an Assignment Satisfying a Debt

For over seventy years courts have policed transactions with an eye
toward preventing tax evasion in the guise of transferred assets.32
Justice Holmes first enunciated the anticipatory assignment of income
doctrine in Lucas v. Earl,33 concluding "tax[ation] . . . [can]not be
escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully
[sic] devised."34 The dissent in Cotnam itself asserted that such
language should prevent successful plaintiffs from using contingent-fee
arrangements with their lawyers to avoid paying income taxes on these
amounts.35 Later courts have advocated this position insisting that to
allow such results would permit litigants to avoid taxation.36 Courts use
phrases such as "but for the taxpayer's effort to shift the receipt" of

the proceeds of the lawsuit, the taxpayer would have come into the
entire amount. 73 Other ways, however, exist to interpret Lucas in these
situations.
In fact, one can easily distinguish Lucas and its progeny from the
typical arrangement in a contingent-fee case.38 As others have noted,

32. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 1 1 1, 115 (1 930) (establishing the assignment of
income doctrine).
33. Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. 399, 41 1 n.5 (2000) (recounting the origins of the
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine).
34. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 1 1 5.
35. See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 19, 126-27 (5th Cir. 1 959) (Wisdom, J., dissent·
ing).
36. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 413-14 (stating that anticipatory assignment
by the taxpayer of the proceeds of the lawsuit must be included in the taxpayer's gross
income); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 7 1 2 ( 1962) (insisting that Lucas applies even if the
taxpayer is not entitled to the attorney's part of the award for a split second).
37. Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. at 417.
38. Id. at 417 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (detailing ways to distinguish assignment of income
cases).
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"it is not clear that the rationale of the assignment of income cases
should apply to contingency-based attorneys' fees."39 This implication
arises because of what the Lucas Court sought to prevent.4 0 When
Justice Holmes referred to "skillfully devised contracts to avoid paying
wealth,"41 he meant j ust that. Mr. Earl attempted to reduce his income
tax liability by relying on a contract with his wife to share all wealth,
however acquired, equally.42 The Court refused to allow contractual
arrangements to shift the tax burden from the source of the income.43
Unlike arrangements meant to reduce tax liability, contingent-fee
agreements do not attribute income to anything other than the source
of the income.44 Plaintiffs do not hire lawyers with the goal of avoiding
taxation on the money due them by transferring a portion of their
claims to their lawyers as a gratuity.45 Some, such as the dissenters in
Cotnam, argue these arrangements amount to an anticipatory assign
ment of income because they discharge a debt to the client's attor
ney.46 This argument misconstrues the contingent-fee arrangement.
Attorneys have no recourse against their clients when seeking pay
ment until the defendant makes good on the judgment. When plain
tiffs prevail, their attorneys look solely to their portion of the j udg
ment, not to their client's. In fact, the whole structure of the
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine rests on the notion that
the taxpayer would have received the income, but for the assignment.47
Here, but for the assignment, neither would have received the income

39. Thad Austin Davis, Note, Cotnam v. Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment
of Contingency-Based Attorneys' Fees - The Alabama Attorney's Charging Lien Meets
Lucas v. Earl Head-on, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1683, 1706 (2000).
40. See Davis, supra note 39, at 1 706 (claiming the Lucas Court was concerned only with
abusive assignments of income).
41. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 1 15 (1930).
42 Id. at 114. It should be noted that the Earls' contract was not one of the "carefully
devised plots" of which Justice H olmes warned. They formed the contract approximately
seventeen years before Congress implemented the federal income tax. See Lauren E.
Sheridan, Note, Trees in the Orchard or Fruit From the Trees?: The Case for Excluding
A ttorneys' Contingent Fees from the Client's Gross Income, 36 GA. L. REV. 283, 291 (2001 ).
43. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 115.
44. See

Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th
Cir. 2000) (noting purpose not to shift tax liability).
45. As those wishing to distinguish Lucas frequently note, most, if not all, anticipatory
assignment of income cases involve transfers between family members, or between debtors
and creditors. See, e.g., id.
46. See Davis, supra note 39, at 1703 (discussing dissenter's reasoning).
47. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-1 7 (1940) (stating, but for the taxpayer's
transfer of interest coupons to his son, the taxpayer would have received the interest); Coady
v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 187, 1 1 91 (9th Cir. 2000) (but for diversion of funds to her creditor the lawyer - the taxpayer would have received the money); Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114
T.C. 399, 417-18 (2000) (Chabot, J., dissenting) (reciting the origin of the assignment of
income line of cases).
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because payment would not have been forthcoming. Simply put, the
"skillfully devised" scheme arises from an attempt to collect the
money, not an attempt to avoid taxation.48 Thus, the correct analysis of
contingent-fee agreements does not involve the anticipatory assign
ment of income doctrine.
Considering what role the attorney plays in recovery clarifies the
objections to applying the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine
in these situations.49 While the client may have earned the right to the
income, collecting these funds requires an attorney's effo rts.50 The
lawyer earns the contingent fee through skill and j udgment.51 Taxes
should accrue only to those who earn the money.52 Nominal owners
who serve as funnels without real access to the money should not
suffer _the taxation of such "income. " 53 This proposition holds the most
sway in areas such as punitive damages.54 Though detractors maintain
an attorney does not earn any part of the award,55 they surely cannot
claim the plaintiff "earns" punitive damages either.56 Such payments

48. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2000) (speculating the goal is
to secure an attorney's services without putting capital at risk, not the avoidance of taxa
tion); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) (assigning part of the claim to
obtain legal services is not within the doctrine of Lucas v. Earl); cf. Kenseth l, supra note 10,
1 14 T.C. at 409-10 (listing and explaining contingent-fee cases but holding assignment of
income doctrine still applies). Bllf see Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 2001)
(claiming Lucas was concerned with skillfully devising the method of payment); Robinson v.
Comm'r, 1 02 T.C. 11 6, 11 7 (1994) (condemning settlement purposefully coordinated with
the defendant in order to reduce taxes).
49. Cf. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856-58 (reviewing case law and emphasizing attorney's role).
50. See id. at 857.
5 1. !ti. at 858.
52. Kenseth /, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. at 413-14.
53. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 , 573 (1978) (stating that the Court
"looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular
form the parties employed"); Escobar v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1326 (1983); Davis,
supra note 39, at 1703.
54. Cf. Kenseth /, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. at 447-48 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
[T]he recovery is determined in a dynamic process in which the exercise of the experience
and skill of the attorney results both in some recovery and in an increase in the value of that
recovery. The attorney creates and adds value; the efforts of the attorney contribute to indeed he may be solely responsible for - both the recovery and its augmentation. Attenu
ated subtleties and refinements of title have nothing to do with the practical realities of con
tingent fee agreements and the relative interests of attorney and client in any recovery that
may ultimately be realized.
Id. (Beghe, J., dissenting); Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs Windfall from
Punitive Damages Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 900, 1 909 (1992) (hereinafter Plaintiffs
Windfall] (claiming that attorneys are attracted to punitive damages cases because of a

desire to capture the windfall).
55. Kenseth l, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. at 413.
56. See Plaintiffs Windfall, supra note 54, at 1903 (describing punitive damages as wind
falls).
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result from the defendant's, not the plaintiff's, past acts or omissions.57
The augmentation of the award above the plaintiff's actual damages
results from the attorney's efforts in the suit.58 The plaintiff did not
"earn" the punitive damages, and, between the client and the attorney,
if either one can be said to have earned them, it was the attorney.

B.

Enjoyment of Income

When read properly, Helvering v. Horst59 is distinguishable from
the contingent-fee line of cases. In an effort to clarify what constitutes
a taxable event, the Supreme Court created a trap fo r the unwary. In

Horst,

the Supreme Court noted that the complaining taxpayer

enjoyed his income by transferring the interest co.upons.from bonds to
his son, just as surely as if he would have retained the income bearing
instruments for himself.6 0 The Court took pains to point out that a
taxpayer could enjoy income "when he has made such use or disposi
tion of his power to receive or control the income as to procure in its
place other satisfactions which are of economic worth."61 This state
ment led many courts into the thicket of trying to determine whether
or not taxpayers truly enjoyed their alleged income, or w hether in fact
someone else had dominion over the money.62 This inquiry misconstrues the Court's reasoning in Horst.
·

The Fifth and Sixth Circuits particularly have insisted on unneces
sarily debating whether taxpayers enjoyed their income under the
meaning of Horst.63 For example, in Estate of Clarks the Sixth Circuit
noted that in Horst and Lucas "the income assigned to the assignee
was already earned, vested and relatively certain to be paid to the
assignor."64 From here, the argument proceeds, because the plaintiff's
enjoyment of the income depended upon the lawyer winning the

57. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart
Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953, 955-56 (1986); Plaintiffs Windfall, supra note 54. at
1 903.
58. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. at 447-48 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (attributing
increase to attorney's experience and skill).
59. 3 1 1 U.S. 1 12 (1940).
60. Helvering, 311 U.S. at 1 17.
61. lei. at 1 1 6.
62. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing who controls
the income producing source); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202
F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 1 9, 126 (5th Cir. 1 959)
(reasoning that, because Mrs. Cotnam had not fully enjoyed the benefit of her economic
gain, she did not realize the gain).
63. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126.
64. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
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lawsuit and earning any fee received, the plaintiff could not possibly
have enjoyed the income by assigning it to the lawyer.65
The majority of circuit courts have correctly noted this argument
has little to do with whether the lawyer's fee was income as to the
taxpayer.66 Few categorize the paying of bills as an enjoyable activity,
yet that is not the point. The outcome should hinge on whether
taxpayers control the flow of funds, no matter that they could not
rightly deem many of these payments discretionary.67 Under such an
analysis, the Internal Revenue Service should prevail.68 But in truth,
this debate centers on when a taxpayer realizes income, which is what
the Horst Court attempted to define.69 Trying to figure out when
someone enjoys the benefit of the economic gain70 amounts to an
attempt at objectively determining if the taxpayer controls it.71 Thus,
those circuits applying the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine
believe that if taxpayers can direct the funds to their lawyers, they
obviously control those funds.72 Those critical of such an approach
maintain this criteria falls short of satisfying the complete "dominion
over the asset" language in the Supreme Court's Glenshaw Glass73
decision.74 The Fifth Circuit in Cotnam fo und it dismaying to argue
Mrs. Cotnam controlled an asset when she could only apply the "gain"
from it to a single, and not very attractive situation.75 The taxpayer's
options consisted of exchanging a fraction of the amount due for a
chance to reclaim the whole amount, or retaining a worthless, albeit

65. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 361 ; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at
1 25-26.
66. See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that not directly
receiving payment from obligor does not prevent full enjoyment of the benefit).
67. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191 (procuring payment directly to creditors cannot prevent
taxation); Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. 399, 409 (2000) (listing cases where the I RS pre
vailed under this theory).
68. Cf Co"dy, 213 F.3d at 1 191 ; Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 409- 10.
69. Helvering v. Horst, 3 11 U.S. 112, 1 1 5-16 ( 1940).
70. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 359; Coady, 2 1 3 F.3d at 1 191; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126.
71. See Horst, 3 1 1 U.S. at 116. This led some to ask if the plaintiff acts merely as a
remote, or proximate, owner. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 39 at 1702.
72 See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (noting the taxpayer benefited
through prosecution of her claim).
73. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (finding the taxpayer liable
for taxes because the gain had clearly been recognized and the taxpayer had complete
dominion over it).
74. See Davis, supra note 39, at 1691; cf Benjamin C. Rasmussen, Note, Taxation of an
Attorney's Contingency Fee of a Punitive Damage Recovery: The Srivastava Appro11ch, 15
B YU J . PUB. L. 301, 301 (2001 ) (framing the question as whether an undeniable accession to
wealth occurred, clearly realized, with the taxpayer having complete dominion).
75. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25.
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complete, right to the asset.76 Therefore, even though the taxpayer
could direct to whom the potential proceeds would go, she had not yet
realized the gain, and once the gain did occur, the contingent-fee
portion was beyond her control. "It seems intuitive that when the goal
of a tax system is to subject net income to taxation, expenditures used
to produce that income should be [deductible]."77
The disagreement over the nature of a contingent-fee agreement
does not, however, end with the anticipatory assignment of income
doctrine, or the requisite level of control to establish dominion. The
Seventh Circuit failed to acknowledge the controversy involving
whether a contingent-fee agreement assigns a portion of the daim
when Mr. Kenseth, the plaintiff in Kenseth v. Commissioner,78 ap
pealed the decision of the Tax Court.79 In summarizing the
taxpayer's claim, the court wrote: :•1n essence, Kenseth wants us to
recharacterize this as a case in which he assigned 40 percent of his tort
claim to the law firm. But he didn't. A contingent-fee contract is not
an assignment."80 Despite the confident tone of this proclamation, the
status of contingency-fee contracts remains a matter of much conten
tion.81 Upon closer

analysis,

the

circuits

in

the minority view

contingent-fee agreements as coming harrowingly close to doing just
that - assigning a part of the claim.82 In light of their opinions, they
apparently feel such agreements cross the line.

76. Id. at 126.
77. Carol Duane Olson, Toward a Neutral Definition of "Trade or Business" in the
Internal Revenue Code, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199, 1210-11 (1986). I.R.C. § 162 (1999) imple

ments such an approach for businesses.

78. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. 399, 412 n.6 (2000) (dismissing the possibility
of an assignment with minimal discussion); Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Holds that
Contingent Attorneys' Fees Must Be Included in a Taxpayer's Gross Income, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2357, 2361 (2002) (claiming the Kenseth II court "failed to appreciate the reality of
contingent fee arrangements as transferring substantive ownership of a portion of a claim").
79. See Kenseth II, supra note 15, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
80. Id. at 882.
81. See, e.g., Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1 995) (referring to a
contingency-fee contract as a vehicle of assignment); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a
Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 625, 639-44 (1995). Few commentators or courts analyze the issue; most simply make
ipse dixit statements then move on. But see Recent Case, supra note 78, at 2362 (applying a
burdens-benefits analysis and concluding the attorney displays many of the indicia of owner
ship).
82. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing assignment as
a division of property); Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854,
857 (6th Cir. 2000) (characterizing what the lawyer received as an assignment); Cotnam v.
Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 19, 125 (5th Cir. 1959) ("[S]he, in effect, assigned to her attorneys forty
percent of the claim . . . . ).
"
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I F IT LOOKS LIKE AN ASSIGNMENT, WALKS LIKE AN

ASSIGNMENT, AND QUACKS LIKE AN ASSIGNMENT . . .
This Part analyzes the opinions finding the lawyer's contingency
fee outside of the plaintiff's income. Section II.A concludes that the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits, while avoiding saying so explicitly,S3 have con
cluded contingency-fee agreements amount to a partial assignment of
the claim. Section 11.B offers support for ruling contingency-fee
agreements are partial assignments by considering the features of the
contingency-fee agreement.
A.

The Indications of a Partial Assignment

The proper categorization of contingent-fee agreements remains
unclear, despite pronouncements to the contrary. Though the Seventh
Circuit stated that a contingent-fee agreement is not a partial assign
ment of the claim, it did not arrive at this conclusion through an inde
pendent analysis.84 Instead, the opinion points out that Wisconsin law
prohibits the assignment of a claim to a lawyer.85 Many states do so
because the common law barred the assignment of a cause of action.86
Originally, such bars were meant to prevent the rich and landed
nobility from harassing others by financing lawsuits.87 When contin
gent-fee agreements first arose, the judiciary predominantly fo und
such agreements champertous.88 Although later jurisprudence decided
contingent-fee

agreements were sufficiently distinguishable

from

83. The Cotnam court came very close to holding so explicitly. See 263 F.2d at 125.
84. The court cited to Young fo r this proposition. Kenseth II, supra note 1 5, 259 F.3d at
884.
85. Kenseth II, supra note 1 5 , 259 F.3d at 883-84. But see Recent Case, supra note 78, at
2361 (asserting that the court misread the applicable Wisconsin law because of its failure to
read the comments following the ethical rule the court utilized in its interpretation). See
generally Rebecca L. Morlock, Note, Bowen v. American Family Insurance Group; An
Unsettling Change in South Dakota Subrogation Law, 4 1 S D. L. REV. 335 (1996) (discussing
whether subrogation amounts to an assignment of the claim and citing to cases where courts
fo und that it does).
.

86. Painter, supra note 8 1 , at 631, 639. Biii see Amy E. Douthitt, Comment, Selling Your
Attorney's Negligence: Should Legal Malpractice Claims Be Assignable in Texas?, 47
BAYLOR L. REV. 177. 180 (1 995) ("The general common law rule of nonassignability of a
cause of action never applied in Texas.").

87. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court; The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 , 232-33 ( 1 998).
88. Champerty is defined as: "I. An agreement between a stranger to a lawsuit and a
litigant by which the stranger pursues the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part
of any judgement proceeds. 2. The act or fact of maintaining, supporting, or promoting
another person's lawsuit." B LACK S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (7th ed. 1 999).
'
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champerty, the courts never established a principle on which to differ
entiate between them.89
In opinions granting taxpayers relief from being taxed on their
attorneys' contingent fees, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits obscure the
true import of their holdings by couching their arguments in terms
meant to fend off attacks under Lucas and Horst.90 The opinions
frequently refer to whether the taxpayer had any right to the income
when it was assigned.91 Thus, the Sixth Circuit notes "the value of the
taxpayer's lawsuit was entirely speculative and dependent on the
services of counsel,"92 while the Fifth Circuit finds it important that the
taxpayer "was a long way from having the equivalent of cash," and it
"was uncertain as to whether it [the claim] had any value."93
In fact, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have implicitly held that plain
tiffs assign a portion of their claim to the attorney upon signing a
contingent-fee agreement.94 This can be difficult to discern from the
cases, given that the courts themselves often seem confused about the
basis and impact of their holdings.95 The Fifth Circuit in Cotnam came
close to explicitly recognizing an assignment when it stated the
taxpayer "in effect, assigned to her attorneys forty percent of the
claim."96 The "in effect" language, however, indicates the court's
unwillingness to state flatly that a partial assignment of the claim had
occurred.97 In Estate of Clarks, the Sixth Circuit used a less direct ap
proach stating "the client as assignor has transferred some of the

89. See Karsten, supra note 87, at 240 (recounting how states allowed contingency fees
by statute but kept champerty Jaws); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An
Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 58-59 (2000) (de
scribing what the champerty doctrine prohibits but claiming exceptions have been common
place); Robert N. Amkraut, Note and Comment, Taxing Contingency Fee Attorneys as
Investors: Recognizing the Modern Reality, 71 WASH. L. REV. 745, 752 ( 1996) (discussing
practical reasons why champerty faded in regard to contingent-fee agreements but offering
no theoretical grounds for the exception). Largely, it seems courts simply ignored the matter
when it was expeditious to do so. In fact, Maine barred contingent-fee lawsuits up until 1 965,
though few champerters likely were prosecuted. See Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process
Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyer's Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
371, 372 n.6 (1998).
90. See Estate of Clarks ex rel Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th
Cir. 2000) (discussing extensively the import of these cases); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d
1 19, 125 �26 (5th Cir. 1959) (same).
91. See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26.
92. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
93. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
94. See Gregg D. Polsky, Taxing Contingent Attorney's Fees: Many Courts A re Getting It
Wrong, 89 TAX NOTES 91 7, 919 (2000) (claiming that these courts found an assignment of
income).
95. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
96. Comam, 263 F.2d at 125.
97. Id.
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trees in his orchard."98 When the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in
Srivastava, its reasoning was considerably less clear. After discussing
assignment in general, the court stated "control over that claim - the
income source or 'tree' - is neither fully divested to the attorney nor
fully retained by the taxpayer-client."99 This effort to characterize the
transaction as a tenancy in common, after earlier having called it an
assignment,100 only serves to confuse the issue. The Estate of Clarks
court made a similar effort, indicating the attorney and the client had
formed a partnership in order to prosecute the claim. 1 0 1
Whatever their reasoning, these courts clearly reject the idea that
an assignment of income occurred, 1 02 unless one concludes that these
courts do not think assigned income taxable unless done in an antici
patory fashion meant to avoid taxation. The only coherent theory rests
on the plaintiff exchanging a portion of her claim for her attorney's
services. This theory, however, presents a problem. States other than
Wisconsin still legally bar attorneys from receiving an assignment of
part of the claim. io3 In fact, the bar was almost universal throughout
the legal systems descended from the English common law.104
Describing these transfers, when the law apparently bars categorizing
them as partial assignments, remains a dilemma.
Faced with this quandary, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have sided
with reality, treating the contingent-fee agreement as a partial
transfer. The well-intentioned but dubious notion that preventing law
yers from acquiring causes of action will reduce frivolous lawsuits
against the innocent1 0 5 should not impede the use of contingency
fee agreements. Many potential plaintiffs with a valid cause of action

98. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir.
2000) (utilizing the tree analogy from Lucas). In Lucas. Justice Holmes attacked arrange
ments "by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 1 1 1 , 1 1 5 (1930). Subsequent cases have attempted to determine if the
trees themselves, or solely the fruit have been transferred. See, e.g., Estate of Clarks, 202
F.3d at 858.
99. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2000).
1 00. See id. at 360.
1 01. Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858.
102. Id. at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25.
1 03. See, e.g., Drake v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 1 65 A.2d 452, 453 (Del. Ch. 1 960).
Apparently the fear is if lawyers could sue on others' causes of action, frivolous litigation
would increase because lawyers would sue in situations where those actually injured would
not. See id. at 454; Amkraut, supra note 89, at 75 1 -52. But, as applied, this results in a very
narrow ban. New York seems mainly concerned that lawyers will take cases involving
minimal damages and try to profit by forcing the defendant to pay huge legal fees. See
Drake, 1 65 A.2d at 453-54.
104. See Martin, supra note 89, at 75-79 (discussing champerty laws in Canada and
Australia); Painter, supra note 81, at 639 (stating that champerty, including contingent-fee
agreements, is still illegal in England).
1 05. See Martin, supra note 89, at 58 (describing the intent behind champerty doctrines).
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cannot afford the great cost of litigating the matter in court.106 For the
legal system to fulfill its societal function it must hold wrongdoers
accountable for their actions.1 07 Access to justice requires the
availability of contingent-fee agreements, as does the State's ability to
influence behavior through the granting of private rights of action.1 08
S o i n the name of equity, and i n the interest of society, courts give a
wink and a nod toward contingent-fee contracts - and even enforce
them.1 09 Courts do so despite the fact these contracts assign part of the
claim and give attorneys rights even when, under a pure contingent
fee agreement, they would have none . 1 1 0
The best indicator that the partial assignment of the claim argu
ment needs careful attention is how the courts that deny that a partial
assignment occurred have insisted on treating the issue. They distin
guish their opinions based, not on their dislike for the partial assign
ment of the claim legality,1 1 1 but on how the state in question applies
its attorney lien laws.1 12 This effort to distinguish Cotnam has led many
observers astray. One adherent of the majority approach meticulously
analyzed each state's attorney-charging statute to predict whether
Cotnam might apply there.113 This analysis included a section stating

106. Karsten, supra note 87, at 239-42; Martin, supra note 89, at 58; Schneyer, supra note
89, at 376.
107. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 376 (stating that contingent-fee agreements allow
enforcement through liability rules thus easing the state's need for administrative rules).
Professor Schneyer states that civil suits function not only to avoid injustice; they also allow
the State to deter wrongful conduct by granting a private right of action in lieu of costly
administrative rules or penal statues. Id.
1 08. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 376 (claiming elimination of contingent-fe e agree,
ments would weaken the State's power).
1 09. See, e.g., Kenseth II, supra note 1 5, 259 F.3d 881 , 883-84 (7th Cir. 2001 ) (explaining
that because attorneys are barred from acquiring ownership of a claim, an assignment of the
claim obviously did not occur, and contingent-fee agreements do not offend champerty doc
trines because they are equivalent to any other form of debt).
1 10. See Painter, supra note 81 , at 640 ("[A) partial assignment of course occurs when a
lawyer charges a contingent fee."); Donna A. Schneiter, Note, Attorney's Divorces: Are
Their Pending Contingency Fee Cases Marital Assets or Not?, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 829, 840
( 1999) ("[A] contingency fee contract is 'a valuable property right' even when the underlying
case has not settled or been adjudicated."); see also Schneyer, supra note 89, at 376-77
(claiming that lawyers are investing in claims).
1 1 1. The Young court specifically considered and rejected the proposition that a
contingent-fe e arrangement constitutes a partial assignment, but then went on to say
Cotnam and Estate of Clarks relied on state law for their holdings. Young v. Comm'r, 240
F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 200 1 ).
1 1 2 See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 1 87, 1 190 (9th Cir. 2000) (pointing out Alaska's
attorney lien statute grants no ownership interest to attorneys over the judgment); Kenseth I,
supra note 1 0, 1 14 T.C. 399, 409 (2000) (stating that the tax court ignores the concurrence
offered by Judges Rives and Brown despite the fact the dissenting judge wrote the holding
itself); Davis, supra note 39 (exploring various courts' focus on the attorney lien issue);
Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 3 1 0 (claiming the First, Ninth and Federal Circuits are espe
cially likely to use this approach).
1 13. See Davis, supra note 39.
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that Texas lien laws were distinguishable, with a cite to the Tax
Court's treatment of Srivastava.114 The analysis failed, not because the
statutes are not distinguishable, but because, in truth, no one really
cares about these statutes or their common law equivalents. These
statutes merely provide courts a convenient means of distinguishing
Cotnam without reaching the Fifth Circuit's problematic conclusion
that contingent-fee agreements assign part of the claim. As the
dissent pointed out, the courts have distinguished Cotnam
on the narrow ground so often that they have obscured the broader

Kenseth I

holding.1 1 5
Thus, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits almost completely disregard that
which so many other courts feign so much interest in. On appeal, the
Srivastava Court found Cotnam indistinguishable from the case at bar,
despite Texas attorneys' rights being wholly derivative of their clients'
rights.11 6 As noted earlier, the Sixth Circuit in Estate of Clarks glossed
over any differences in attorney-charging statutes saying Alabama's supposedly highly distinguishable11 7 - statute and Michigan's com
mon law version were "more or less" the same.1 18 In fact, when
Kenseth tried to use this approach with the Seventh Circuit, Judge
Posner tartly replied that every state, to his knowledge, gave the
attorney "a lien on the proceeds of any settlement or judgment to the
extent of the contingent fee . " 1 19
B.

The Case for Partial Assignment of the Claim

Because contingent-fee agreements transfer so much control over
the handling of a claim, it is difficult to argue that the plaintiff trans
fers a mere interest in the judgment to the attorney. The exact level of
control an attorney exercises over a claim upon accepting a case

1 1 4. Davis, supra note 39, at 1 7 1 6.
115. The narrow ground being the specific statute at issue in Cotnam. Judge Beghe also
noted the record remains unclear whether anyone even mentioned the Alabama statute in
the Tax Court phase of the Cotnam saga. Kemeth I, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. 399 at 434 n.34
(2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting).
1 1 6. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 364 n.33 (5th Cir. 2000). The dissent argued
that the case was distinguishable from Cotnam on this basis. Id. at 367-68. (Dennis, J.. dis
senting). One commentator believes the Fifth Circuit implicitly held no future decisions
would be based on the attorney lien laws. See Polsky, supra note 94, at 918 n.1 6.
1 17. Title 46, section 64 of the Code of Alabama allows the attorney's lien to attach
when he files the complaint, rather than at judgment like other states. Davis, supra note 39,
at 1 689-90. The attorney's lien also takes precedence over the plaintiffs set off and other
liens, except tax liens. Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1 187 (9th Cir. 2000); Davis, supra note 39,
at 1 687.
118. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir.
2000).
1 1 9. Kenseth II, supra note 1 5, 259 F.3d 881, 882 (7th Cir. 2001 ).
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remains a subject of debate.12 0 The fact that the attorney gains a great
deal of control at the signing of a contingent-fee contract, however,
stands as a given. Those not qualified to press their own claims hire
attorneys familiar with the system and capable of working within it to
achieve a particular goal.121 The attorney is the expert in this situation,
estimating the claim's worth,122 and determining how to handle discov
ery and pretrial.123 The client will generally defer to the attorney on
trial strategy, and even on whether or not to accept or reject settle
ment offers.124 Clients generally do not have any concept of what a
reasonable fee should be, or what the lawyer's fee will be in the end. 1 25
Practically speaking, the attorney's d e facto level o f control i s almost
total.
The counter argument that the ultimate control over the suit
remains with the plaintiff-client fails to adequately consider the reality
of the situation. Those who do not wish to view contingency-fee
lawsuits as partial assignments of the claim dismiss lack of control
arguments.126 They note clients retain ultimate control over the case
because they can fire their attorneys if displeased with their efforts.127

1 20. See Amkraut, supra note 89 at 763; Douthitt, supra note 86, at 1 83 (recounting the
court's fear that clients lose control of litigation upon signing of contingent-fee agreement);
Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Pho,enix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 , 18
(1 984) (stating that the mystique of high stakes litigation deters control); Schneyer, supra
note 89, at 374 (discussing the use of contingent-fee agreements to discourage the changing
of counsel - thus retaining control of the litigation).
121. Cf. Karsten, supra note 87, at 241 -42 (quoting historical material saying rights mean
nothing without the ability to enforce them through legal representation).
122 See Painter, supra note 81 , at 663-64, 691; cf. Schneyer. supra note 89, at 403 (im
plying attorneys evaluate the worth of claims but withhold this estimate from clients);
Amkraut, supra note 89 at 763 (treating lawyers as investors who use contingent-fee agree
ments to get a good return on their investment).
1 23. Cf. F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF
PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 62 (1964) (claiming contingent fees give
lawyers control of litigation); Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of
Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 955 (1 990) (claiming that lawyers can con
trol litigation because of clients' ignorance); Miller, supra note 1 20, at 18 (discussing pretrial
hyperactivity which "keeps the meter running"); Schneyer, supra note 89, at 377, 394
(accusing lawyers of shirking by pursuing clients' claims less vigorously than they should).
124. See Kenseth I, supra note JO, 1 1 4 T.C. 399. 445 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting);
MACKINNON, supra note 123 at 196 (maintaining lawyers control settlements and some
plaintiffs never figure out what they got); Schneyer, supra note 89 at 389, 394; Philip J.
Havers, Student Article, Take the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical Problems of the
Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 621,
626 (2000).
125. See Bimholz, supra note 123, at 954.
126. See Kenseth II, supra note 15, 259 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001 ); Young v. Comm'r,
240 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 200 1 ).
1 27. See Young, 240 F.3d at 378; Amkraut, supra note 89, at 378; Douglas G. Hickel,
Comment, Losing in the Tax System After You Win in the Court System: Should Contingent
Fees Paid to the Attorney Be Included in the Taxpayer-Client's Gross Income?, 20 ST. LOUIS
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Yet this right often proves illusory in practice. The contingent-fee
lawyer dropped from a case does not go away empty handed.128 Courts
routinely handle such situations by fo rcing the client to reimburse the
fired attorney at an hourly rate for any work already done on the
case.129 Other courts willingly enforce the contingent-fee contract,
granting the lawyer whatever share the agreement calls for out of the
final judgment. 13 0 One court went so far as to allow the lawyer to press
the claim even after the client no longer wished to pursue it,131 while
another stated if a partial assignment did occur, the attorney had a
right against being discharged.132 To maintain that the client still re
tains control in such situations reduces control to a theoretical, rather
than an actual, right. Control is of little practical consequence when its
exercise would cause two sets of lawyers' fees to eat up the entire
award. Add to this the fact that the courts advocating the ultimate
control theory also force taxpayers to pay taxes on both their share
and the attorneys' contingent fees, and one can easily see why any
client who needs the money in controversy cannot possibly afford to
switch attorneys in most situations. 133
To clarify the nature of these agreements, it proves useful to con
sider how the contingent-fee contracts themselves address ownership
of the claim issues. The contract at issue in Srivastava stated the client
agreed to "sell, transfer, assign and convey to my said attorneys the re
spective undivided interests in and to my said claim."134 Attorneys also
routinely include language to retain control over settlement talks.135
Because of a real possibility the lawyer's and client's interests will

U. PUB. L. REV. 477, 487 (2001 ) (maintaining clients retain a high level of actual control be
cause they can always discharge the lawyer).
1 28. See MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 80 (claiming courts protect contingent-fee
attorneys at clients' expense).
1 29. See, e.g. , Chase v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1 962)
(holding attorney was entitled to actual and reasonable price for services); Phelps v. Elgin,
1 84 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 962).
1 30. See Phelps, 184 N.E.2d at 802-03 (English, J., concurring) (stating that the contract
should be enforced as written); Maw v. Noble, 354 P.2d 121, 1 23 (Utah 1960).
1 31. See Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Andrews, 67 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 902)
(allowing the attorney-assignee to prosecute to judgment in the name of the assignor).
132. See Chase, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (involving cases of a contract coupled with an inter
est).
1 33. Such was the case in Paula Jones's lawsuit against President Clinton. Based on the
reported amounts involved, if Jones must pay tax on the portion of her settlement going
towards attorneys' fees, her entire $850,000 settlement would go towards attorneys' fees and
taxes, plus she would have to pay another $38,000 out of pocket. James Serven, The Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Contingent Legal Fees in Personal Injury Cases, 30 COLO. LAW. 81,
82 (2001).
134. Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 368 (5th Cir. 2000).
1 35. See Kenseth /, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. 399, 401 (2000) ; Ward v. Orsini, 152 N.E. 696,
697 (N.Y. 1 926); Karsten, supra note 87, at 252.
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diverge,136 attorneys often insert clauses forbidding the client from
compromising or settling the case without the attorney's consent.137
Although courts generally will not allow contracts that prohibit clients
from settling, they do allow clauses saying clients must consult their
attorney before settling.138 Other courts allow implicit bars by permit
ting the plaintiff's attorney to sue a defendant who settles directly with
a plaintiff despite knowing of the contingent-fee agreement.139 Thus,
although the client supposedly decides if a settlement has been
reached and for how much, in reality the attorney usually makes such
decisions. 140
One should not, however, view control as a monolithic entity,
incapable of being split between numerous people. The crucial ques
tion hinges on whether the plaintiff retained enough control to attrib
ute the portion of the award dedicated to the lawyer to the client
also.141 Obviously, a complete assignment did not occur,142 but this fact
does not indicate the plaintiff retained sole control.143 Plaintiffs'
lawyers now commonly refuse to take a case on anything but a contin
gency basis,144 and such contracts inevitably constitute adhesion
contracts - where the courts typically view the party purchasing
services as vulnerable and lacking options and control.145 Thus, clients
have little control over payment methods.146 Attorney control over
other aspects of the case becomes clear in situations where the client

136. Painter, supra note 81, at 671-72.
137. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 401 ; Ward, 152 N.E. at 697 (stating that the
lawyer gets half of any settlement concluded without his consent); Karsten, supra note 87 at
252. But see id. at 251 ("Courts decisively and consistently held contingency fee contracts
that prohibited clients to settle to be void as contrary to public policy.").
1 38. See Ward. 152 N.E. at 697-99 (allowing attorney to claim half of settlement because
plaintiff settled without lawyer's consent).
1 39. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 438 (Beghe, J., dissenting); Tex. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Andrews, 67 S.W. 923, 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 902). But see Henslee, Monek &
Henslee v. D.M. Cent. Transp Inc.. 870 F. Supp. 764, 767-68 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (refusing to
allow contingent-fee attorney action in tort against insurance company which settled with
client without attorney's input; any agreement barring plaintiff from settling without attor
ney permission is void as against public policy).
.•

140. See Havers, supra note 124, at 626.
1 41. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 442, 448 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
1 42. See Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 303 (noting that this would require a complete
divestment of control).
143. See supra notes 1 20-124 and accompanying text.
144. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 422 (Beghe J., dissenting); Painter, supra
note 81, at 662-63.
145. Cf. Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. at 422 (Beghe, J., dissenting) (noting
contingent-fee agreement is a standard form contract without which plaintiffs attorney
would not have represented him).
146. See id. (Beghe, J., dissenting); Painter, supra note 81, at 662-63; Sheridan, supra
note 42, at 300 n.1 39.
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has little legal knowledge.147 A lawyer might file in a court of general
jurisdiction on the chance that it will lead to a higher award when a
court of limited jurisdiction would be better f or the client's overall
chances of recovery. 148 A lawyer may settle quickly after doing little
work f or a high hourly fee, or drag the case out in hopes of a huge
payoff.149 A client unsophisticated in legal strategies will not even
know such issues exist. 1 50 This list does not even consider cases where
the lawyer manipulates the clients themselves.1 51 Some courts try to get
around such realities by asking who the bona fide owner is, thus
ignoring who the actual owner is. 1 52 But in the end, no matter the
semantic intricacies, the system gives the attorney a strong financial
interest in the claim. 1 53 Attorneys become almost a separate party,
with their own interests and motivations. 1 54
Faced with this difficult situation, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
adopted an equitable solution with a minimum of legal analysis.1 55
They followed the example of earlier courts, confronted with
champerty cases, who avoided classifying the matter before them by
declaring what categories it did not fall into. 1 56 Thus, the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits state that these cases do not implicate the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine and then move on from there . 1 57 Left

1 47. See Miller, supra note 120, at 18 (claiming the mystique of litigation deters control).
148. MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 201.
1 49. See Havers, supra note 124, at 630 (citing MACKINNON, supra note 123, at 1 98-99).
1 50. Cf. Painter, supra note 81, at 671 -74, 691 (claiming lawyers have an informational
advantage over client). While such acts may be unethical, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1 .4 (1983), pretending they do not occur helps no one - except the unethical
lawyers.
1 5 1. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 89, at 389 n.76 (discussing a study claiming New
York personal injury lawyers tend to tell their clients the defendant offered less than they
truly did, then later reveal this higher number as a second offer and persuade the client to
take it (citing DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 1 1 0-1 1
(1 974))).
1 52. See Drake v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 165 A.2d 452, 454 (Del. Ch. 1960) (find
ing that claimant was the bona fide owner of a claim derailed champerty claim). Whether a
court would make such a distinction after Frank Lyon is open to debate. See Frank Lyon Co.
v. United States, 435 U.S. 56 1 , 583-84 (1 978) (mandating looking to the economic realities of
a situation); see also Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Substance over Form: The Cornerstone
of Our Tax System or a Lethal Weapon in 1he IRS's Arsenal?, 8 AKRON TAX J. 9 1 , 92-97
( 199 1 ) (detailing the Supreme Court's development of the substance over form distinction).
1 53. See Kenseth /, supra �ote 1 0, 1 14 T.C. 399, 450 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting).
1 54. Havers, supra note 124, at 625.
1 55. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th
Cir. 2000); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 1 9, 126 (5th Cir. 1 959).
1 56. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25: Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir.
2000); Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
1 57. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 25; Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 360; Estate of Clarks. 202 F.3d
at 857.
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unsaid, or stated with little further attention, if not an anticipatory
assignment of income, the transaction must be a partial assignment of
the claim itself.158 These federal courts find it galling to make plaintiffs
pay taxes on the portion of their claims surrendered for the privilege
of vindicating their rights. 159
If, however, the plaintiff has in fact assigned a portion of the claim
to his attorney, this assignment also has tax consequences.160 Because
this matter ultimately turns on a tax issue, one should remember the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") traditionally· looks to the substaqce
of a transaction, deeming the form utilized irrelevant to tax liability.161
If one accepts that a partial assignment occurred, then applicable case
law exists to deal with this situation.162 While the anticipatory assign
ment of income doctrine does not apply, the anticipation of income
doctrine does.163 In contingent-fee cases, the IRS should not tax the
plaintiff on what the attorney collects because that portion of the
claim was transferred irrevocably and forever.164 The plaintiff, as well
as the attorney, did, however, recognize a gain when the transfer
occurred.165
The attorney's payment to the plaintiff fo r a portion of the claim
- legal services - should trigger the same tax consequences as would
a payment from the judgment itself.166 Though one can .think of this as

158. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125; Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 359; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d
at 858.
159. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362 n.28 (quoting Cotnam and Estate of Clarks passages
concerning worthlessness of the claim without an attorney and stating that the only eco
nomic benefit of an attorney is to collect a portion of what plaintiff really deserves); Estate of
Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126.
1 60. See Kenseth /, supra note 10, 1 1 4 T.C. 399, 41 1 n.4 (2000) (maintaining that even i f
the Sixth Circuit is correct, a taxable event has occurred); Polsky, supra note 94, a t 917
(claiming that a proper analysis includes the attorney's fee in plaintiffs gross income be
cause of § 83).
161. Amkraut, supra note 89, at 763.
162. See generally Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (discussing anticipation of
income); Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (same).
1 63. See Hort, 313 U.S. at 28.
1 64. While the client could conceivably get the claim back, see, e.g. , Chase v. Superior
Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stating plaintiff has to pay fired
attorney at hourly rate but will get entire judgment for himself), it will not return in the
normal course of events, cf. Evans v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 40 (1970) (placing repeated emphasis
on the fact that the taxpayer transferred everything he had, not just the right to interest).
While the court may in effect force the attorney to sell that portion of the claim back, the
client will have to pay to get it back. See Chase, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Provisions for a buyback
upon the occurrence of a given event do not prevent recognizing that a transfer occurred.
165. See Hort, 313 U.S. at 31 (holding that transfer caused realization of gain); Cotlow v.
Comm'r, 22 T.C. 1 019, 1 022 (1 954) (stating that realization occurs upon the complete aliena
tion of title to property for valuable consideration).
166. See Hort, 313 U.S. at 31 -32 (holding that payment for early cancellation of a lease is
treated the same as lease payments would be); Catlow, 22 T.C. at 1022 (holding that insur-

1122

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1102

an "in lieu of" test,167 it derives from long-established tax principles.168
This proposal, however, presents a problem in regard to measuring the
amount of gain realized.169
Ill. ESTABLISHING AVALUE FOR THE CAUSE OF ACTION
This Part argues that applying section 83 of the Internal Revenue
Code to contingent-fee situations, while seemingly reasonable, proves
inappropriate upon closer inspection. Section III.A concludes that sec
tions 83 and 162 are not well suited to deal with the current dilemma.
Section III.B disputes whether a contingent-fee agreement can be con
sidered an unvested interest in property, thus avoiding the ambit of
section 83 altogether. Section 111.C advocates viewing the exchange of
a portion of the claim fo r legal services from a barter perspective.
A.

Section 83 Mainly Applicable to the Employee-Attorney

The solution proposed by some scholars, to tax the transfer under
section 83,170 would fail to adequately address the problem at hand.
Though section 83 deals with the transfer of property for services,171 it
was not designed for the contingent-fee situation. Section 83 deals
with employers' payments to employees or independent contractors.172
While this section might seem to apply at first, a careful reading of the
language implies otherwise.173 Consider that section 83 deals mainly
with the tax consequences of receiving income not redeemable until
sometime in the future. 174 The main proponent of applying section 83

ance agent who purchased other agents' rights to renewal commissions is taxed as those
agents would be).
1 67. See Hickel, supra note 1 27, at 498 (advocating applying the Raytheon "in lieu of'
test).
1 68. See Hort, 3 1 3 U.S. at 31 ("Where . . . the disputed amount was essentially a substi
tute for rental payments . . . it must be regarded as ordinary income . . . . ).
"

169. See Hickel, supra note 1 27, at 495-96 (describing the difficulty ensuing because the
cause of action does not have a definite value).
170. Polsky, supra note 94. at 917. 8111 see Robert W. Wood, Letter to the Editor, Leave
Section 83 out ofthis Mess, 89 TAX NOTES 1 187, 1 1 87-88 (Nov. 27, 2000) (claiming this would
be a strain).
1 71. l .R.C. § 83 (1 999) (regarding property transferred in connection with performance
of services).
1 72 See l . R.C. § 83(a). Reading Polsky's article one rather gets the impression he thinks
the plaintiff should be taxed under this section. Polsky, supra note 94, at 920. That is not pos
sible. This section deals with the taxation of the employee - the lawyer - not the employer
- the plaintiff. See l .R.C. § 83.
·

1 73. See I.R.C. § 83.
1 74. See l.R.C. § 83(a). Rasmussen makes a similar error when he cites to Polsky. See
Rasmussen, supra note 74. at 3 1 5- 1 6. He says transferors should have to include the fair
market value of what they gave up in their own income. Id.
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acknowledges that section 83 was meant to deal primarily with stock
options,175 and a quick glance at the section and the accompanying
Treasury regulations easily bears this out.176 The proposition that the
legislative history of this section indicates it was meant to deal with all
transfers of property fo r services is not well taken.177 Simply because it
could be stretched to deal with this situation, does not make it the
only, let alone the best, solution.
Within section 83, · only section 83(h) deals with the tax conse
quences to the employer making the expenditures.178 Section 83(h), in
turn, refers the reader to section 162, where the code allows a deduc
tion for business and trade expenses.179 If section 83 did truly apply to
contingent-fee agreements, it would explain what the courts in the
minority have already been doing, allowing the plaintiffs to deduct
collection fees - in the form of attorneys' fees - from their gross
income.180 The idea that these taxpayers can fit in under this section
presents an extremely questionable proposition. A hobby or occa
sional pursuit does not qualify as a trade or business.181 The suggestion
that taxpayers can create a business by suffering harms and then
litigating to procure judgments or settlements offers an unrealistic
scenario at best.182 Even if the judge did accept this proposition, it ap
pears unlikely the taxpayer could engage in this behavior frequently
enough to meet the definition of trade or business.183 It should be
noted, however, the courts do give trade or business under this section

175. Polsky, supra note 94, at 919 (referring to the legislative history).
176. See l.R.C. § 83(c)(3) (regarding sales which may give rise to suit under § 16(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act); Treas. Reg. § 1 .83-l (f) (1978) (listing three examples, all
involving stock); Treas. Reg. § 1 .83-3(a)(7) (as amended in 1985) (listing five examples, all
involving stock); Treas. Reg. § l .83-3(c)(4) (as amended in 1985) (listing five examples, all
involving stock); Treas. Reg. § l.83-5(c) (1978) (listing four examples, all involving stock);
Treas. Reg. § 1 .83-7 (1978) (dealing specifically with th� taxation of nonqualified stock op
tions).
177. Polsky, supra note 94, at 919.
178. I.R.C. § 83(h) (2003) (dealing with deduction by employer).
179. I.R.C. § 162 (1998).
180. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 114 T.C. 399, 407 n.3 (2000) (noting that if recovery is
received in a business setting, attorneys' fees are fully deductible).
181. See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 24, 36 (1987) (finding man who spent sixty
to eighty hours a week gambling was in the trade or business of gambling); Olson, supra note
77, at 1208-10 (sustaining IRS's contention that horse breeding operation was not a business
because no true business would operate at such losses for such a long time, and it must there
fore be an operation not engaged in for profit under § 183). But see id. at 1209 n.57 (saying
taxpayers who use business-like methods will almost always be found to be in trade or busi
ness because of good faith standard).
182. See Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35 ("to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer
must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity. . . . ).
"

183. See id.
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a truly expansive definition.184 One professor even proposed that O.J.
Simpson could subtract his legal fees resulting from the criminal and
civil cases against him arising out of his wife 's murder under section
162. 185
The origin of the claim test may actually apply to a number of the
contingent fee line of cases, including Srivastava,

Cotnam

and

Estate of

Clarks, by

allowing them in the backdoor of section 162. The origin of
the claim test asks if the expenditure arose "in connection with the
taxpayers' business or income producing activities rather than their
personal activities[:) " 186 Though the Court never established an exact
definition of business activity,187 it reads the "income producing activi
ties" language broadly.188 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has noted
"various courts, including the Tax Court have implicitly held that a
taxpayer may be engaged in the trade or business of being an em
ployee,"189 and the Seventh Circuit concluded "it is well settled that an
employee's activities constitute a trade or business. . . . "190 The legal
system long ago accepted that employees engage in a trade or
business.191 The Supreme Court considers business a comprehensive
term, that which occupies the time, attention and labor of men.192
Some commentators contend that courts often actually apply a
connectedness or motive test to reach these unusual results.193
Under such a generous reading as this, Mrs. Cotnam, Dr.
Srivastava, and possibly the estate of Mr. Clarks could all subtract
their legal fees from their gross income if section 83

-

and thereby

184. See id. at 33 ("If a taxpayer . . . devotes his [full time to the] activity . . . and it is his
intended livelihood source . . . basic concepts of fairness . . . demand that his activity be regarded as a trade or business . . . . ).
"

185. Dorocak bases this argument on Simpson's contention that the police framed him
because of his status as a minority celebrity. Thus, the police would be motivated by the
goal of ruining Simpson and his trade of marketing himself as a likable personality and
spokesperson. Defending against the criminal charges and lawsuit would constitute the only
way to protect his trade. See John R. Dorocak, Sports and Entertainment Figures (and
Others) May Be Able to Deduct Legal Expenses for Criminal Prosecutions (and Wrongful
Death Suits), 13 AKRON TAX J. 1. 4-5 (1997).

186. Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Stara, The Origin of the Claim Test: A Search .for
Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97 (1997). The origin of the claim test originated in United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
187. See Schnee & Stara, supra note 186, at 107-08.
188. The IRS has actually characterized some people as being in a trade or business
against their wishes. See Olson, supra note 77, at 1220-25.
189. Steffens v. Comm'r, 707 F.2d 478, 482 (11th Cir. 1983).
1 90. Groetzinger v. Comm'r, 771 F.2d 269, 276 (7th Cir. 1985).
191. Olson, supra note 77, at 1224 & n.160.
192. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27-28 (1987). But see Olson, supra note 77, at
1212-13 (stating that the IRS has held profit motive alone is not enough).
193. See Dorocak, supra note 185, at 3.
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section 162 - applies.194 All of their suits emerged from their "trade
or business" of .working.19� Mrs. Cotnam sued .when she was not
bequeathed her promised share of Mr. Hunter's estate for her work as
his attendant.196 Dr. Srivastava's suit emerged from a local television
investigative report of his medical practice.197 The estate of Mr. Clarks
could possibly use section 162, depending on what capacity he was
acting in when struck on the head while unloading his truck.1.98 This
interpretation, while interesting, and certainly beneficial to the plain
tiff, seems an unlikely reading, and stands little chance of being ac
cepted by the Internal Revenue Service or the courts.199 Additionally,
section 162(a)(l)'s requirement that salaries paid must be reasonable
might prevent plaintiffs from utilizing this section.200 Much of the con
troversy surrounding contingency fees and their taxation springs from
the sometimes astronomical per hour rates.201
B.

No Substantial Risk of Forfeiture. Exists

Another potential problem emerges in considering whether to
apply section 83 to the situation at hand. Section 83 O:Qly applies when
an employer offers an employee an unvested interest in property.202
This includes situations entailing a substantial risk of forfeiture.203
Gaining a partial assignment of a claim, however, may very well not
fall under this heading. The text does make clear that, if the employee

1 94. See Kenseth I, supra note 10, 1 14 T.C. 399, 407 n.3 (2000) (discussing the differences
in tax treatment in regard to businesses and individuals).
1 95. See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2000) (doctor); Estate of
Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 2000) (trucker);
Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 1 1 9, 1 20-21 (5th Cir. 1 959) (personal attendant).
1 96. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 1 20-21.
1 97. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 355.
198. It is unclear from the appellate opinion whether Mt. Clarks ·was shopping at
K-Mart in a personal capacity, making a delivery, or if he in fact worked for K-Mart. See
Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855. The facts given in the district court opinion, however, imply
that he was working at the time. Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, No.
96-CV-60446-AA, 1 998 WL 839415, at *l (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 1 998).
1 99. See Purdey v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 413, 418 (1997) (saying ordinary and neces
sary expenses of conducting a business are deductible under § 162 unless the trade or busi
ness consists of service performed as an employee).
200. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1999); Robert I. Keller, The Taxation of Barter Transac
tions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441, 443 n.10 ( 1982) (discussing "reasonable allowance" for salaries
and other compensation).
201. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 372 (explaining the argument that contingent fees
produce windfa lls for the lawyer); Painter, supra note 81, at 635, 652-53 (advocating regula
tion of contingent fees to curb excessive fees); Schneiter, supra note 1 10 (stating contingent
fee may work out to much more than a reasonable hourly fee).
202. See I.R.C. § 83(a) ( 1999).
203. l.R.C. § 83(a)(l).
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must still perform substantial work before the property vests in him,
then a substantial r.isk of forfe iture exists.204 B ut the Treasury regula
tions explain that a nonlapsing condition does not represent a substan
tial risk of forfeiture if such fo rfeiture would occur only if the em
ployer discharged the employee for cause.205 Some imply that if
leaving voluntarily would cause a forfeiture, there is a substantial risk
of fo rfeiture as envisioned by section 83.206 Treasury Regulation sec
tion 1.83-3(c)(2), however, states that if an employee must return the
property upon accepting a job with a competing firm, this possibility
will generally not qualify as a substantial risk of forfe iture.207 By exten
sion, if the employee only loses the property because of a voluntary
resignation, for any reason befo re vestment, this should not qualify as
a substantial risk of forfeiture.208
Once the attorney and client sign the contingent-fee agreement, a
substantial risk of forfeiture no longer exists.209 The law barring poten
tial plaintiffs from assigning their claims to attorneys developed
because policy makers judged it unwise to give lawyers that level of
control over a claim.210 Applying section 83, however, indicates an
acceptance of the proposition that such an assignment did occur. To
then turn around and then argue a substantial risk of fo rfeiture exists
seems, at the least, inconsistent. If clients fire their lawyers for
anything but cause, the courts wilt order reimbursement of either the
entire contingent fee specified in the contract, or at the very least at an
hourly rate.2 1 1 And if the court decides to base its decision on whether
a substantial amount of work was still required, this would necessitate
a case-by-case analysis. Although ethical rules often prohibit taking
cases .on a contingent-fee basis when the case will require very little
work and when such an arrangement is clearly not in the client's best

204. l .R.C. § 83(c)( l ) (1999).
205. Treas. Reg. § l .83-3(c)(2) (as amended in 1 985).
206. See Polsky, supra note 94, at 921 .
207. Treas. Reg. § l .83-3(c)(2).
208. Cf. id. (stating that a chance of voluntary departure does not constitute a substan
tial risk of forfeiture).
209. Amkraut refers to this as a limited risk of forfeiture. Amkraut, supra note 89 at 763
n.88.
·
2 10. See id. at 751 -52 (recounting common law concerns about lawyers owning their
clients' claims).
211. See Chase v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 962);
Phelps v. Elgin, 1 84 N.E.2d 799, 802-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 962) (English, J., concurring); Maw v.
Noble, 354 P.2d 1 2 1 , 1 23 (Utah 1 960). One could argue that if the lawyer cannot collect the
entire contingent fee and must settle for her normal hourly rate instead, she did not truly
receive an assignment of a part of the claim. In fact, this pay discrepancy lies at the heart of
some courts' decisions insisting on enforcing the contingent-fee agreement and refusing to
calculate judgments based on an hourly rate. See Phelps, 1 84 N.E.2d at 802-03 (English, J.,
concurring) (advocating contract enforcement over a quantum meruit approach).
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interest,212 not all lawyers walk the straight and narrow in this
regard.213 With an individual analysis, the claim could vest immediately
upon signing fo r cases requiring very little work, or well into trial
preparation for cases necessitating more work. Despite all this, the
fact remains that the lawyers will collect a fee in all cases except where
they quit or are discharged fo r cause.214
C.

Barter Analysis: The Better Approach

The case against using section 83 to approach the tax repercussions
of contingent-fee agreements becomes even clearer when one consid
ers that an alternative method more closely fits the facts and allows for
a middle ground. The Internal Revenue Service already requires those
engaged in barter exchanges to count their increase in wealth as
income.215 This describes exactly what occurs when plaintiffs exchange
a share in their claim for legal services.216 After the exchange, the
plaintiffs have legal representation and the lawyers have the right to
press the claim and collect a portion of the proceeds.217 Internal
Revenue Code section lOOl(b) requires taxpayers to report the fair
market value of services provided in exchange for property.218
While many rightly claim the tax code can make no claims to fair
ness,219 a barter approach can remove some of the inequities of other
approaches in this instance.220 No convincing reason exists to link the

212. See Havers, supra note 124, at 629 (citing Model Code of Professional Responsibil
ity § 2-106(A) barring "clearly excessive fees"); cf Schneyer, supra note 89, at 407 (discuss
ing cases which pose no genuine risk of nonrecovery).
213. See Havers, supra note 124, at 628-29 (claiming that many cases where the outcome
is not in doubt involve high contingency fees).
214. If they quit for cause, they could very well bring a restitution suit.
215. See l.R.C. § 61(a) (1999); Treas. Reg. § 1 .61-2(d) (as amended in 1992) (dealing
with services paid for with property).
216. Rev. Ru!. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 outlines the general requirements for reporting
barter income.
217. Karsten, supra note 87, at 231.
218. I.R.C. § lOOl(b) (1999).
219. "Not to appear humorous or flip, but if these were equitable proceedings, the un
dersigned doubts the government could ever win because some might never view the tax
structure as equitable." Riverton Inv. Corp. v. United States, 5:99CV00089, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20770, at *23 (W.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2000). Justice Blackmun in Groetzinger wrote,
"basic concepts of fairness (if there be much of that in the income tax law) . . ." Comm'r v.
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 33 (1987). Another snide court has observed, "common sense and
the tax law are rarely even waving acquaintances." Skoglund v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 833
(1982).
220. Many would not agree, claiming the tax code can only achieve horizontal equity if
plaintiffs who hire lawyers on a contingency basis receive the same treatment in the tax
system as those who pay an hourly rate. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 317. In tax
law, however, form can matter greatly when it comes to qualifying for deductions. See
Bernard J. Grant, III, Recent Development, No Taxation Withollt Realization: Srivastava v.
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values of the two things being exchanged, unless establishing value in
a more realistic manner proves impractical.221 When the government
can independently value the gain of each party, it should use the actual
gain each received.222 Such a solution holds particular appeal in a legal
setting once a court renders a verdict. "Reliance on the value of the
property given up as the sole and conclusive evidence of the value of
the property received should clearly be limited to cases where the
value of the property received cannot be reasonably ascertained in
other ways."223
Contingent-fee arrangements often charge clients an exorbitant
rate.224 If the barterer lacks knowledge in the area in which the barter
arises, this detracts from the rationale of using his or her valuation of
the transaction fo r tax purposes.225 The case law supports this senti
ment as well, with the courts placing much emphasis on the fair
market value of the services provided - not what the parties actually
paid.226
Because the Internal Revenue Service can easily determine how
much each party actually benefited, these gains should represent the
amount of reportable income. Attorneys obviously will have to report
as income whatever their portion of the judgment was.227 Then the
Internal Revenue Service should determine whether these amounts
were the clients' actual gains. At this point, an objective method exists

Commissioner, the Fijih Circuit's Answer to Tax Treatment of Attorney's Fees Under a
Contingency Fee Agreement, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 363, 364 (2001 ). Those who view
contingent-fee plaintiffs and hourly-fee plaintiffs as similarly situated have a strange notion
of similar. First, lawyers in many fields simply refuse to take a case on an hourly basis. Sec
ond, anyone who can afford an attorney at an hourly rate is by no means similarly situated to
those forced to use contingent-fee lawyers. Finally, if the wealthy believe giving up 30-50%
of their award to a lawyer produces tax benefits justifying the cost, they should not have any
trouble finding a lawyer to accommodate them.
221. Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47, 453 (statirig that both parties should look to the
value of what they received as opposed to what they gave up). This has justly been called a
circular exercise because no real reason exists for applying the value of one thing exchanged
over the value of the other when determining the tax rate for the exchange. Id. at 455. See
also Amerada Hess Corp. v. Comm'r, 517 F.2d 75, 88 (3rd Cir. 1 975) (noting "obvious dan
gers in evaluating the consideration involved in one side of a barter by determining the
worth of the consideration on the other side").
222. See Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47, 453-54.
223. Id. at 454.
224. See Schneyer, supra note 89, at 372.
225. Keller, supra note 200, at 455. But see Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 145 1 , 1454
(Fed. Cir. 1 995) (stating that the "fee arrangement signifies the value that the parties placed
on attorney's services").
226. See, e.g., Badell v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (2000).
227. See l.R.C. § 61(a) (1999).

February 2003)

Contingent-Fee Agreements

1129

to find out.228 If the attorneys kept track of their billable hours on the
case, as most will in the hope attorney's fees will be awarded, the
clients' actual gains can be measured.229 In many cases, the figure will
represent a much lower amount than what the attorney actually re
ceived.230 The clients' tax liabilities should rest on this.231 The value of
what the plaintiffs gave up, though easier to ascertain, provides little
value in determining their gain.232 The contingent-fee agreement trans
fers a portion immediately.233 Nothing, however, bars uncoupling the
parties' gains and measuring them at the time a court renders a j udg
ment.234 Professor Keller specifically advocates a rule of valuation of
what the barterers would have paid in cash if they had used cash.235
One need not stretch to believe if clients were paying in advance, or
at least at an hourly rate, they would pay much less than what a
contingent-fee lawyer eventually gains.236
The Internal Revenue Service should tax plaintiffs on the amount
they actually received from their attorneys in exchange for a portion
of their claims. If an attorney charges $250 per hour and spent 100
hours on the case, the client received a benefit of $25,000.237 To argue
that because the attorney actually receives one million dollars that this
amount was the benefit to his client borders on the absurd.238 It also
demonstrates that a partial assignment occurred.239 Otherwise the

228. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 277 (1998) (indicating that contingent-fee lawyers keep
track of their billable hours).
229. See id. at 282 (finding that thirty-nine of forty-three contingent-fee lawyers had the
information necessary to estimate effective hourly rate - including billable hours).
230. "Experience tells us that a presumption of equality is simply not appropriate in
many barter transactions. Often one side outbargains the other and in no sense can it be said
the two sides of the exchange are equal." Keller, supra note 200, at 452 n.49.
231. Cf Badell, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 424 (using fair market value of services received).
232. See Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47.
233. See Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857-58
(6th Cir. 2000 ); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1959); Painter, supra note 81,
at 640.
234. See Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2000) (relating IRS request
that court apply the open transaction doctrine from Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931 ), to
a case where Cotnam will apply).
235. Keller, supra note 200, at 455-56.
236. See Joel S. Newman, Determining Value in Barter Transactions: A Response to
Robert Keller's The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 68 MINN. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984)

(claiming that most barter services "are items that could not have been sold for cash, or cer
tainly not for a cash price the seller would have accepted").
237. Schneyer would adjust the benefit upward based on the chances of recovery at the
time the case was taken - sound theory but difficult to implement in practice. See Schneyer,
supra note 89, at 396.
238. See Keller, supra note 200, at 446-47 (arguing that both parties should look to the
value of what they received).
239. See Painter, supra note 81, at 674.
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"owner" of the claim could dismiss the attorney on the eve of
victory.24° Courts do not allow this because they realize in a suit
fo r restitution, the attorney would lose $975,000.241 The attorney
outbargained the client. For the government to tax plaintiffs, not on
the fair market value of what they received, but on the fair market
value of what they gave up, adds insult to injury.
CONCLUSION
The circuits disagree about the propriety of allowing plaintiffs to
assign a portion of their claim to an attorney. These concerns consti
tute a historical artifact, the pressing issues of the Middle Ages
gumming up the j udicial machinery of the twenty-first century.
Recognizing that lawyers largely control the course and outcome of
suits and settlements will allow courts to respond to the reality of the
situation instead of how they think the system should work. Partial
assignments of the claim already exist, and to call them a lien on the
judgment changes nothing. The government allegedly levies taxes on
the fair market value of what the taxpayer receives. Here, taxpayers
receive legal services in exchange for a part of their claim and should
have to pay taxes on this amount. The taxpayers do not, nor will they
ever, receive the full portion going to the attorney. The fact they once
had a right to this amount does not change the reality they will never
realize the gain. Esau sold his birthright to Jacob fo r a pottage of

lentils.242 Esau should have been taxed on the value of the lentils
received, while Jacob should have been taxed based on the value of
Isaac's estate.

240. See Painter, supra note 8 1 , at 674 n.223 (discussing clients who discharge their at·
torneys "on the courthouse steps").
241. See id. (noting that in such situations the quantum meruit award should equal the
agreed upon fee).
242. Genesis 25: 29-34.

